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This paper deals with the economic effects and the policy implications of trade liberalisation on the 
Jordanian economy, with emphasis on welfare, income distribution and real wages of heterogeneous 
households, by using a neoclassical dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. 
Specifically the paper assesses the impacts of preferential trade liberalisation with the European Union 
(EU) and then compares them with those brought about by broad and non-discriminatory trade 
liberalisation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Association Agreement (AA) between Jordan and the European Union (EU) was signed in 1997 
and is part of a larger programme, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that involves through a 
network of bilateral relations the EU and countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region. The AA between Jordan and the EU replaced the 1997 Cooperation Agreement, and entered 
into force in May 2002. It reduces and eliminates, over a 12-year period, custom duties and charges on 
importing most EU industrial products to Jordan. Import duties on EU agricultural and food products 
are only partially eliminated. 
The process of trade liberalisation is expected to provide benefits for Jordan in terms of lower import 
prices of investment and consumption goods that bring about higher consumer welfare. However, 
trade liberalisation has also a negative impact on government revenue due to reduced import tariff 
duties. Therefore, a possible decrease in government transfer to households could make welfare 
impacts ambiguous, particularly for those households who rely heavily on government transfer. 
Furthermore, low income households will probably fail to exploit the benefits of increased incentives 
for investment and will therefore fail to make use of the full potential of trade liberalisation. As 
pointed out by Winters (1996), trade liberalisation generally contributes to poverty alleviation, but 
trade reforms might create some losers, even in the long-run. 
A trade policy issue playing a role in Jordan's trade liberalisation is the debate about global versus 
regional integration (Winters, 1996). Whereas there is wide empirical evidence that economic growth 
rates and trade liberalisation are positively related (Sachs and Warner, 1995), there is further evidence 
supporting the view that non-discriminatory trade openness leads to higher growth than preferential 
trade liberalisation does (Vamvakidis, 1998). Moreover, preferential trade liberalisation is likely to 
cause trade diversion, that is a diversion of Jordanian imports from more efficient non-EU countries to 
more costly EU producers. The policy implications for Jordan therefore suggest that broad and non-
discriminatory openness would be more beneficial than regional integration (Hoekman and Djankov, 
1997, Ghesquiere, 1998). A multilateral and non-discriminatory trade liberalisation process would also 
avoid the costs of trade diversion, although it would clearly reduce further government revenues, and 
hence require additional compensatory measures of public finance, which in turn would make the 
impact on welfare even more ambiguous than in the case of discriminatory trade liberalisation. 
In the debate on the merits of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) as a tool of trade liberalisation, the 
supporters of such arrangements argue that PTAs move the member countries and the world towards 
freer trade. Multilateralists (see Panagariya, 1998) argue instead that PTAs actually fragment the 
global trading system and move away from true liberalisation. 
Previous studies by Hosoe (2001) and Lucke (2001) on Jordan’s trade liberalisation implemented 
static CGE models with one representative household and focused on aggregate welfare and fiscal 
effects. The work by Hosoe (2001) investigates the impacts of two trade policy scenarios for Jordan,   3
the implementation of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of a free trade area with the EU, by 
using a static model based on Devarajan et al. (1990). He finds positive welfare effects brought about 
by the Uruguay Round and an additional welfare gain due to the EU-Jordan preferential trade 
agreement. The work by Lucke (2001) focuses mainly on fiscal effects of the EU-Jordanian 
Association Agreement, and discusses fiscal responses aiming at overcoming the loss in government 
revenue. However, these models do not account for dynamic effects due to capital accumulation and 
can not analyse income distribution effects.
1 
In the general equilibrium analysis of income distribution issues, there are mainly two approaches. 
One is to use a CGE model with one single representative consumer. The changes in commodity and 
factor prices generated by a trade liberalisation experiment are applied to household data in order to 
compute the impacts on poverty and income distribution. This approach has been followed, among 
others, by Ianchovichina et al. (2001) and by Hertel et al. (2002). The second approach is to embed the 
household dissaggregation within the CGE model. As pointed out by Winters et al. (2004), the latter 
approach has the advantage of being internally consistent. Simulations help therefore to identify the 
household classes that are vulnerable even when trade liberalisation is beneficial on average. The 
model in this paper is based on the latter approach, i.e. the one in which the disaggregated household 
groups are embedded within the CGE model. 
In the context of computable general equilibrium modelling several studies have been conducted to 
assess aspects of income distribution (see Reimer, 2002 and Winters et al., 2004, for a survey). 
Theoretical studies by Chatterjee (1994) and Caselli and Ventura (2000) analyse the effects of 
implementing heterogeneous consumers into a neoclassical framework. However the first approach 
that analyses income distribution in an applied dynamic neoclassical general equilibrium framework in 
which heterogeneous households are assumed to have different discount rates has been developed by 
Feraboli and Trimborn (2006). 
This paper addresses therefore the question of how both preferential and non-discriminatory trade 
liberalisation combined with a parallel process of complementary economic reforms affect welfare of 
heterogeneous households by implementing a dynamic neoclassical computable general equilibrium 
(CGE). More specifically, the model builds upon previous work done by Feraboli et al. (2003) and by 
Feraboli and Trimborn (2006). 
Feraboli et al. (2003) implement a dynamic CGE model characterised by the assumption of one 
representative consumer as used by Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). The dynamic 
CGE model is augmented by introducing heterogeneous households. Households are disaggregated 
into six different groups ranked by their disposable income. Within each group one representative 
individual maximizes the sum of discounted utility according to their own budget constraint. 
Household groups’ individual tax rate, wage rate, initial endowment of assets, transfer from 
                                                 
1 To my knowledge, there is no other study on Jordan's trade liberalisation based on a dynamic CGE model with 
heterogeneous households.   4
government and foreign transfer, as well as consumption preferences, are calibrated by using the data 
from a household survey. Moreover, the time preferences of each different household group are also 
calibrated from the survey data. The model is solved by means of the mathematical software Gauss 
and by applying the relaxation algorithm proposed by Trimborn et al. (2008). 
The simulation results lead to welfare changes in Jordan between –0.08% and 0.42%, providing 
therefore evidence that trade liberalisation has different effects across heterogeneous households and 
can even create some losers. Low-income households gain slightly more from trade liberalisation in 
terms of welfare, since they can overcome losses in government transfer by an increase in the wage 
income due to aggregate capital accumulation. However, income inequality increases, since high 
income households can exploit the benefits of increased incentives for investment. This results in 
higher capital income and leads therefore to an increase in the income gap. Moreover, whereas 
preferential trade liberalisation makes one household worse off, non-discriminatory trade liberalisation 
leads to positive effects on welfare for all household groups. Finally, the behaviour of aggregate 
variables is qualitatively consistent with the results by Feraboli et al. (2003). 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes briefly the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, 
Section 3 explains the model, Section 4 deals briefly with the dataset and the calibration procedure, in 
Section 5 the simulations are analysed and discussed, and finally Section 6 draws the main 
conclusions. The Appendix presents graphs, which show the long-run dynamic behaviour of some 
variables. 
 
2. The EU-Jordan Association agreement 
 
Before the start of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, relations between the EU and the countries in 
the MENA region were ruled by the Cooperation Agreements dating from the 1970s. Under the 1977 
Cooperation Agreement Jordan was granted duty-free access to the EU markets for most industrial 
products and preferential access for agricultural commodities. The Cooperation Agreement was 
unlimited in duration, and it was not reciprocal. In 1979 the Agreement allowed Jordan exports to 
enter the EU market free of quantitative restrictions. 
The relations between Jordan and the European Union are now governed by the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, which is implemented through the EU-Jordan Association Agreement and the regional 
dimension of the Barcelona Process. The EU-Jordan Association Agreement is part of the bilateral 
track of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The final aim is the creation of a free trade area between 
the EU and Jordan over a period of 12 years, in conformity with the provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched at the   5
1995 Barcelona Conference between the European Union and its 12 original Mediterranean Partners.
2 
This Partnership governs the policy of the EU towards the Mediterranean region. It comprises two 
complementary tracks, the bilateral agenda and the regional agenda. The framework for the bilateral 
agenda is the Association Agreement. The regional agenda is implemented through a number of 
regional working groups on a range of policy issues including trade, customs cooperation, and 
industrial cooperation. 
The EU-Jordan Association Agreement was signed in November 1997 and entered into force in May 
2002. This agreement provides the gradual reduction of import duties on imports of EU industrial and 
agricultural products into Jordan over a period of twelve years. Table 1 shows the pre-AA import duty 
rates and the tariff reduction schedule of the Association Agreement for the eight good sectors.
3 
 
Period Agric.  Mining Food  Text.  Paper  Chem.  Miner.  Others
Pre-Agreement  rates  17.0% 9.4% 29.2% 14.1% 13.2% 2.8% 12.2%  12.2%
Entry into force of the AA  17.0%  5.6%  29.2% 8.5%  7.9%  1.7%  7.3%  7.3% 
One  year  after  17.0%  5.0%  29.2% 7.5% 7.0% 1.5% 6.5% 6.5% 
Two  years  after  17.0%  4.4%  29.2% 6.6% 6.2% 1.3% 5.7% 5.7% 
Three  years  after  17.0%  3.8%  29.2% 5.7% 5.3% 1.1% 4.9% 4.9% 
Four  years  after  15.3%  2.8%  26.3% 4.2% 4.0% 0.8% 3.7% 3.7% 
Five  years  after  13.6%  2.5%  23.4% 3.8% 3.5% 0.8% 3.3% 3.3% 
Six  years  after  11.9%  2.2%  20.4% 3.3% 3.1% 0.7% 2.9% 2.9% 
Seven  years  after  10.2%  1.9%  17.5% 2.8% 2.6% 0.6% 2.4% 2.4% 
Eight  years  after  8.5% 1.6%  14.6% 2.4% 2.2% 0.5% 2.0% 2.0% 
Nine  years  after  8.5% 1.3%  14.6% 1.9% 1.8% 0.4% 1.6% 1.6% 
Ten  years  after  8.5% 0.9%  14.6% 1.4% 1.3% 0.3% 1.2% 1.2% 
11  years  after  8.5% 0.6%  14.6% 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.8% 0.8% 
12  years  after  8.5% 0.0%  14.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Table 1. Tariff reduction schedule of the AA with the EU. 
 
Jordan joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in April 2000, after starting the process of 
regional integration with the EU. It could be pointed out that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
depart from the non-discriminatory principle of the WTO and are therefore conflicting with the WTO 
‘most-favoured nation’ (MFN) rule. However, WTO members are allowed, under specific conditions, 
to set up custom unions and free trade areas. In order to increase regional economic integration Jordan 
is part of the so-called ‘Agadir’ process, i.e. the Mediterranean Arab Free Trade, together with Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia, and is member of Arab Free Trade Area Agreement with other 13 countries 
belonging to the Arab League. Jordan also signed bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with other 
countries in the MENA regions, with the USA and with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
                                                 
2 The 12 original partners are: Israel, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, 
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. Two of them, Cyprus and Malta, joined the EU in 2004. Libya has 
observer status since 1999. 
3 The production sectors are Agriculture, Mining, Food, Textiles, Papers, Chemicals, Minerals, and Others.   6
Trade liberalisation is expected to provide benefits for Jordan in terms of lower consumption and 
investment prices, that bring about a rise in welfare. Investment demand plays a key role in the process 
of trade liberalisation, and is potentially important to the dynamic behaviour of output over the long-
run (Francois et al., 1997 and Baldwin, 1993). Since lower investment prices create incentives for 
investment, the capital stock is expected to rise over the long-run. On the other hand, trade 
liberalisation has an unpleasant effect for the Jordanian government. There is a clear loss in 
government revenue, due to foregone import tariff duties. Such an impact is likely to be particularly 
strong for Jordan, where government revenue relies heavily on custom duties.
4 
The policy implications for Jordan suggest, therefore, that the government should accompany the trade 
liberalisation process with appropriate measures of economic policy in order to counteract the adverse 
effects on government revenue due to the reduction in custom duties. Such measures should involve a 
reform and modernisation of the tax system and broadening of the tax base as well as a reduction in 
government expenditure (Lucke, 2001). 
Economic theory suggests that the positive effects of non-discriminatory trade liberalisation, in terms 
of lower domestic composite prices, are larger than those brought about by preferential trade 
liberalisation. However, the unpleasant impacts on the Jordanian economy, i.e. larger decrease in 
government revenue and subsequent stronger public finance measures, might lead to even more 
ambiguous welfare effects, and might have a bigger impact on income distribution and therefore 
widen the gap between the rich and the poor. 
The expected decrease in government revenues due to import tariff reduction will likely force 
government expenditure to decrease. This potential decrease in government expenditure will probably 
include a reduction of government transfer to households. Since the poorest households rely heavily 
on these transfer payments, it is likely that trade liberalisation will affect different households 
asymmetrically. 
 
3. The Model 
 
The Jordanian economy is modelled as a dynamic small open economy. For each of the six different 
household groups, a representative consumer maximizes discounted intertemporal utility subject to a 
budget constraint. The domestic economy has nine production sectors, eight of which produce goods 
and one produces services. Aggregate private consumption, government consumption, and aggregate 
investment are Cobb-Douglas composites of nine different sectoral outputs, which, in turn, are 
composites of domestically produced and imported goods (Armington,1969). Firms produce nine 
different commodities using a Leontief production technology that employs sectoral goods and a 
value-added production, which is in turn a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite of 
                                                 
4 Import duties from EU trade in Jordan in the period 1994-96 averaged 12% of total tax revenue and 2% of 
GDP, total import duties averaged more than one-third of total tax revenue and about 6% of GDP (Abed, 1998).   7
capital and six different kinds of labour. Total output can be sold domestically or exported according 
to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) specification. The Government raises taxes and 
collects import tariffs. Government revenues are spent for a fixed amount of government consumption 
as well as for transfers to households. 
The domestic economy is a price-taker in international markets. Perfect competition and full 
employment are assumed in all sectors. Production factors are perfectly mobile across sectors. 
3.1. Households 
The representative consumer chooses consumption and new capital so as to maximise their discounted 
utility, subject to the budget constraint, the motion equation of capital, the equality between savings 
and investment, and the given initial level of capital stock. 
The problem of each representative infinitely-lived household i is therefore to maximize discounted 
intertemporal utility 

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where Ci, YDi, Ki and SAVi are consumption, disposable income, capital and saving of household i, 
respectively. Each representative household discounts future utility with discount rate ρi, which is 
specific to each household category. PC and PI are the composite prices of private consumption and 
investment goods and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. 
Disposable income of each household group is given by 
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where wi, Li, Ki, GTi and FTi denote the individual wage rate, labour endowment, capital endowment, 
government transfer and foreign transfers to household i, respectively. The interest rate r is identical 
for each household since capital is a homogenous good. Each household pays a different income tax τi 
depending on its household group. 
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where ci,j is household i's consumption of good j,  , ij   is the share parameter of good j in consumption 
of household i, and Ωi is the shift parameter in the Cobb-Douglas consumption function of household 
i. 
3.2. Firms 
Sectoral output in the domestic economy is determined by a two-stage production process, which 
exhibits at the top tier a Leontief (or fixed-proportions) specification between intermediate input and 
value-added output. Each representative firm producing commodity j generates total output according 
to the following production technology 
1, 9,
,1 , 9 ,
min , ,..., , 1,...,9
jj j
i








where  Qi and VAi are sectoral output and value-added output of sector i, respectively; qk,j is 
intermediate input produced by sector k and used in the production of activity j; aVA,j and ak,j denote the 
Leontief coefficients. 
At the second tier, intermediate input qi,j is a Cobb-Douglas composite of domestic and foreign 
intermediate consumption goods. 
Value-added production is determined by a technology characterized by a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) between the primary inputs, capital (KDj) and six different types of labour LDi,j, 
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where Aj is the time-invariant technological parameter, αi,j is the share of labour of household i, and σj 
denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between primary inputs. At the value-added production 
stage, firms minimize production costs subject to the above technology constraint. 
3.3. Government 
The government consumes an exogenous amount of goods, raises taxes and tariffs, and provides 
transfers to consumers. The government is assumed to run a balanced budget. Although at first sight 
the assumption might look unrealistic, it is actually appropriate and roughly consistent with 
government fiscal balance data for Jordan provided by the IMF. 
Government consumption is determined by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) Armington 
specification between domestically-produced goods and imports. Government revenue is generated 
from the Value-Added Tax, that applies with different rates to domestic and imported goods (VAT
D 
and VAT
M) the income tax (TY) and import duties (TM) which apply with different rates to the EU and   9
the rest of the world, and exogenous and fixed foreign grants (FRG). The expenditure is given by an 
aggregate transfer to households (TR) and an aggregate fixed consumption of goods and services (G). 
The government budget is therefore given by 
DM VAT VAT TY TM FRG TR G       
3.4. Market clearing 
The equilibrium in the factors markets requires for each type of labour, aggregate endowment of 
labour to be equal to aggregate labour demand and aggregate capital stock to be equal to aggregate 
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where Li and Ki are, respectively, labour and capital supplied by household i. 
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where Xj , Ij and Gj are aggregate absorption, investment demand and government consumption. 
The equilibrium in the balance of payments is given by: 
99 6
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where Mj and Ej are, respectively, imports and exports of sector j, PWMj and PWEj are the exogenous 
world prices of, respectively, imports and exports of sector j, FTi is foreign transfer to household i, and 
FGR are foreign grants donated to the Jordanian government. 
 
4. Data and Calibration 
 
The calibration procedure is based on the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Jordan constructed for 
the year 2002.
5 On the assumption that the dataset represents an equilibrium of the economy, 
functional parameters in the model, such as share and shift parameters, are calibrated, i.e. they are 
estimated, such that the SAM represents a solution of the model where all variables are stationary 
except asset accumulation of individual households. The reason for this is that the fractions of savings 
and assets are not the same across households, and, therefore, the assumption of a stationary individual 
capital accumulation would violate the SAM. 
Household survey data allows disaggregation into six different groups of households. Each group 
differs with respect to labour income, capital income, transfers from government and from abroad, 
                                                 
5 The SAM was constructed by Feraboli and Kolev.   10
income-tax payments, and savings, as well as total consumption and the composition of total 
consumption. Households are taxed with a progressive, general income tax, resulting in different net 
interest rates. Therefore, each household faces different incentives for saving. Time preference rates 
are then calibrated so that they exactly offset this effect in the long-run. Table 2 presents size and 
income composition of the household groups. For convenience household group one (HH1) is denoted 
as the poorest and household group six (HH6) as the richest household group.
6 
The elasticities of substitution have been taken from the existing literature (Devarajan et al., 1999, 
Devarajan and Go, 1998, and Lucke, 2001). The domestic interest rate is set to 0.1. 
The model is programmed in Gauss and solved with the relaxation procedure as proposed by Trimborn 
et al. (2008). 
 




HH1  81184 48% 27% 14% 11% 
HH2 583420  58% 24% 10% 8% 
HH3 970240  58% 27% 8% 7% 
HH4 1251301 52% 32% 9%  7% 
HH5 1224470 45% 39% 8%  8% 
HH6 939704  30% 57% 6% 7% 




Since the dataset available for the calibration procedure represents the Jordanian economy in the year 
2002, this is the benchmark year. All variables at their benchmark levels have been normalised to one. 
Exogenous shocks are then implemented in the model, in order to compute the counterfactual 
equilibrium determined by the change in the policy regime. The effects of the policy change are 
assessed by comparison between counterfactual and benchmark equilibria. 
The two simulations run in this work have two components: (i) the gradual reduction of import duties 
given by the EU-Jordan Association Agreement (AA), i.e. the schedule shown in Table 1, and (ii) the 
domestic counteracting policy response, i.e. the endogenisation of aggregate government transfer to 
households, which is expected to decrease.
7 
The first simulation applies the gradual reduction of import duties only to the EU imports, i.e. it 
implements the AA with the EU. In the second simulation the trade liberalisation is non-
                                                 
6 The share of capital income of total income of the poorest household group (HH1) is unexpectedly high. I 
suspect that households misreported self-employment labour income as capital income. However, richer 
household groups earn considerably higher capital income per capita. Therefore, I expect the results to be 
substantially unaffected. 
7 More precisely, aggregate transfer from the government to households is endogenous, whereas the share of 
each household’s transfer in aggregate transfer is fixed.   11
discriminatory, that is the gradual reduction of import tariff rates applies to all imports, according to 
the same time schedule provided by the AA and shown in Table 1. 
In the first simulation, the immediate effect of reducing import rates on EU imports is a change in the 
relative prices in the domestic economy. The price of EU imports falls relatively to the price of 
imports from the rest of world. The composite import price will also decrease relative to the price of 
domestically-produced goods. The fall in the import prices boosts domestic demand and increases 
incentives for investment, which in turn leads to faster capital accumulation. In the long-run 
equilibrium this leads to a higher value of aggregate capital stock. Output is also expected to increase 
in the long-run. The loss in government revenue due to reduction in import duties is partially offset by 
the expansion in the tax base in the long-run. In the short-run government transfer to households is 
expected to fall to compensate for the immediate drop in government revenue. Consumption is likely 
to increase in the long-run on aggregate and also for each household class, but in the short-run 
consumption of specific household groups or even aggregate consumption might fall 
The impact on welfare on each household class is therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, consumption 
is likely to increase in the long-run and this has therefore a positive impact on welfare. On the other 
hand, the fall in the government revenue brought about by trade liberalisation forces the government to 
reduce transfers to households, at least in the short-run. This affects negatively disposable income of 
households, who are forced, ceteris paribus, to reduce consumption. Clearly this will affect welfare 
negatively. Moreover, whereas aggregate consumption might increase in the short-run, the benefits 
might be distributed unevenly across different households, and some specific household category can 
be worse off after the trade liberalisation takes place. 
The second simulation brings about a bigger negative effect on composite import prices, which is 
likely to have a larger positive impact on welfare than under the case of discriminatory trade 
liberalisation. However, full liberalisation has also a larger negative impact on government revenue. 
This might result in a larger decrease in government transfer to households and therefore in a larger 
negative impact on welfare. Hence the impact on welfare of individual households might be in 
principle ambiguous under both scenarios. The overall impact on welfare will depend on the 
magnitudes of two effects: lower prices brought about by import tariff reduction and lower disposable 
income determined by the domestic complementary policy measures. 
The welfare effects of the simulations are summarised in Table 3. As expected, households are 
affected differently by trade liberalisation. The results show positive welfare effects for all household 
groups under the scenario of non-discriminatory trade liberalisation, whereas preferential trade 
liberalisation is not Pareto improving since one representative household (HH5, the second richest 
group) is worse off. 
Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix show the dynamic path of private consumption. Under both scenarios 
the consumption levels of the three richest households (HH4, HH5 and HH6) falls below the initial 
benchmark level (equal to one) and increases afterwards, implying that these household groups must   12
give up consumption in the short-run in order to achieve higher future consumption. The common 
feature of the consumption path of all household groups is the increase in the short-run and the 
approach to the long-run equilibrium from below. 
 
Scenario  HH1 HH2 HH3 HH4 HH5 HH6 
AA with the EU  0.12  0.42  0.18  0.11  -0.08  0.14 
Full  liberalisation  0.12 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.11 
Table 3. Welfare effects (percent change). 
 
Since welfare gains are higher for poor households, one might expect income inequality to decrease. 
However, the opposite is the case. The Gini coefficient (Gini, 1912) is used as a measure of income 
inequality. From the initial value of 0.2763, the Gini coefficient increases slowly to 0.2786 in the 
scenario of the AA with the EU and to 0.2837 in the scenario of broad and non-discriminatory trade 
liberalisation. Hence, the process of trade liberalisation leads in both case to larger income gap among 
household groups. 
The reason for this can be seen in Figures 3 and 4. Whereas the capital stocks owned by the richest 
household increase over time, the two poorest household groups (HH1 and HH2) use their capital 
assets to smooth consumption and therefore deaccumulate capital. This leads to a widening income 
gap between rich and poor, as clearly indicated also in Figures 5 and 6. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the path of real wages. As expected, the real wage is at all periods above the 
benchmark level. The poorest household groups experience a slightly larger increase than rich 
households. 
Finally the path of government transfer to households is shown in Figures 9 and 10. Given the 
decrease in government revenue, government transfer to households is forced to fall. As shown 
graphically, during the gradual reduction of the EU import tariff rates, the drop in government revenue 
forces the government to cut transfer to households, which falls below the benchmark value of one, 
has a decreasing trend until the 12th period, increases very slightly and finally approaches the steady 
state from below. The path of transfer in the initial 12 years shows ups and downs. This rather 
unexpected time path characterises also the trend of government revenue and is due to the fact that, 
whereas time is continuous, the import tariff reduction is a discrete-time process, i.e. it takes place at a 
specific point in time. This causes a discrete adjustment in government revenue, that fluctuates around 




In this paper the question of how preferential and non-discriminatory trade liberalisation affect 
different households has been investigated. The model implemented here is a dynamic, neoclassical 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, augmented by introducing heterogeneous households.   13
Each of the six household group differs with respect to income, initial endowments of assets, transfers 
from the government and from abroad, wage rate, income tax rate and individual preferences. Whereas 
several studies implemented CGE models to address trade liberalisation and income distribution issues 
in a dynamic framework, this work uses the approach developed by Feraboli and Trimborn (2006), 
who introduced the fundamental assumption that different household groups are characterised by 
different discount rates, which are calibrated from the available data. 
Trade liberalisation lowers prices for investment and consumption goods in the domestic economy and 
therefore boosts internal demand and output, which in turn leads to faster capital accumulation. 
Government transfer to household decreases due to foregone government revenue brought about by 
the reduction in import duties. The results of the simulations support the fact that welfare effects are 
different across households groups, and under the scenario of preferential trade liberalisation one 
household group is even worse off. Therefore trade liberalisation alone is not always Pareto improving 
for Jordan. Moreover, welfare gains are slightly higher for poor households, who can compensate for 
the reduction in transfer from the government by an increase in labour income. However, the income 
gap between rich and poor increases slightly. Whereas rich households’ capital income increases 
sharply in the long-run due to exploitation of investment incentives, low-income households 
deaccumulate capital over time in order to smooth consumption. 
Hence, the introduction of heterogeneous households into a standard dynamic CGE model provides 





Figure 1. Effects of the AA with the EU on consumption.   14
 




Figure 3. Effects of the AA with the EU on capital. 
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Figure 5. Effects of the AA with the EU on income. 
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Figure 7. Effects of the AA with the EU on real wages. 
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Figure 8. Effects of full liberalisation on real wages. 
 
 
Figure 9. Effects of the AA with the EU on government transfer to households. 
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